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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW: JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING
AND ADJUDICATION
Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides
for judicial review of rulemaking and adjudication by administrative
agencies.1 Of the many developments in administrative law in the past
decade, 2 the judiciary's willingness to engage in genuine, substantive
review of agency determinations was one of the most significant. Al-
though the courts continued to recognize their general obligation to de-
fer to agency decisions,3 they nevertheless resolved to examine
administrative action much more closely than in years past. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit initiated
this doctrine of more rigorous review,4 variously labelled the "substan-
tial-inquiry,"'5 "close-scrutiny, ' 6 or "hard-look"' 7 doctrine.8 The
1. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). That section states in relevant part:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and deter-
mine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court
shall-. . . (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law ... (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record ....
2. For a good discussion of the developments in administrative law of the last decade, see K.
DAvis, ADMINisTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1:9 (2d ed. 1978).
3. See, ag., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
'"This standard [arbitrary and capricious ]. . . is a highly deferential one. It presumes agency
action to be valid... [I]t forbids the court's substituting its judgment for that of the agency and
requires affirmance if a rational basis exists for the agency's decision." Id at 34.
4. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971):
[The court's] supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not merely in case of
procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the legislative charter, but more
broadly if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination of danger signals,
that the agency has not really taken a "hard look" at the salient problems, and has not
genuinely engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.
See also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckel-
shaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
5. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
6. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1363 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'dandremandedsub
nom Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Supreme Court appeared to adopt the hard-look doctrine in Citizens To
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, stating that judicial review of
agency decisions entails "thorough, probing, in-depth review" 9 even
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of the APA. t0 Commen-
tators have praised the judiciary's creativity and willingness to supple-
ment the bare procedural and substantive outlines of the APA.11 The
Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co. v. Na-
tional Resources Defense Council, Inc., with its sweeping dicta re-
proving this judicial initiative,12 failed to subdue enthusiasm for the
hard-look doctrine.1 3 However, recent Supreme Court decisions have
emphasized Vermont Yankee's narrow concept of the courts' role in re-
viewing agency decisions.
7. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (Powell, J.); Aberdeen & Rockfish
R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 422 U.S. 289, 327 n.28 (1975); Cul-
peper League for Envtl. Protection v. NRC, 574 F.2d 633, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(Leventhal, J.); Chautauqua County EnvtL Defense Council v. Adams, 452 F. Supp. 376, 380
(W.D.N.Y. 1978).
8. Rodgers, A HardLook at Vermont Yankee: En'ironmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67
GEO. L. 699, 704 & nn. 41-43, 705 (1979). Professor Rodgers views the hard-look doctrine as
involving three components:
First is the substantive component, under which the courts read closely the operative
statute to make sure the agencies stay within the scope of discretion assigned by Con-
gress. Second is the procedural component, under which the courts have assumed a
power to oversee the fairness of agency decisionmaking....
Third, and most important, is the incessant demand of the hard-look case law for
reasoned decisionmaking.
Id at 705 (footnote omitted).
9. 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). This "probing" review involved examination of the facts to
determine whether the agency acted within its congressionally delegated "authority and discre-
tion." That review also required the Court to determine whether the agency's decision "was based
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error ofjudgment."
Id. at 415-16.
10. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
11. DAvis, supra note 2, § 6:1. "Perhaps about nine-tenths of American administrative law is
judge-made law, and the other tenth is statutory, but even the statutory portion is largely a codifi-
cation of judge-made law." Id. § 2:18. "Formally, the chief element [in judicial decisions on
administrative law]'is interpretation of the APA, but realistically, the new law is judicially created
and is usually more in the nature of common law than of finding what Congress intended in
1946.' Id. § 6:1.
12. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). "Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exer-
cise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them.. . ... Id. at
524. "[N]othing in the APA... permitted the court to review and overturn the rulemaking pro-
ceeding on the basis of the procedural devices employed (or not employed) by the Commission so
long as the Commission employed at least the statutory minima . . . ." Id. at 548 (italics in
original).
13. DAvis, supra note 2, §§ 6:37, 6:37-1 (Supp. 1980); DavisAdminisradive Common Law and
the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH L. Rnv. 3, 13-16; Rodgers, supra note 8, at 708 ("Upon
analysis, it is safe to predict that the decision will be sharply contained.").
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
This note examines the more significant developments of the past
two years in judicial review of agency rulemaking and adjudication.
Part I analyzes the Supreme Court's recent application of Vermont Yan-
kee to justify its increasingly deferential attitude towards agency deter-inations.14 The analysis centers on the implications of this attitude
for the administrative common law and section 559 of the APA. Part II
discusses American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan,15 focus-
ing on the unique problems that scientific issues pose for reviewing
courts.' 6 Part III examines the Supreme Court's decision in FCC v.
WNCN Listeners Guild,17 concentrating on the Court's extreme defer-
ence towards the agency, the effect of such deference on the case's final
result, and the implications of the decision for future developments in
judicial review.' 8
I. THE PERPETUATION OF VERMONT YANKEE'S DEROGATION OF
THE ADMINISTRATION COMMON LAW
With its statement that only in "extremely compelling circum-
stances" may courts impose procedural requirements on agencies in ad-
dition to those set forth in the APA, 19 Vermont Yankee contradicted
both the common law and section 559 of the APA.20 The case law
supports the Court's observation that the judiciary should generally al-
low agencies to promulgate their own procedural rules within statutory
bounds.21 However, the Supreme Court has frequently required agen-
cies to develop procedures additional to those set forth in the APA.22
14. See notes 19-77 infra and accompanying text.
15. 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981).
16. See notes 94-135 infra and accompanying text.
17. 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
18. See notes 136-87 infra and accompanying text.
19. 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) at 543.
20. Section 559, 5 provides:
This subchapter and chapter 7... do not limit or repeal additional requirements
imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law. Except as otherwise required by law,
requirements or privileges relating to evidence or procedure apply equally to agencies
and persons. Each agency is granted the authority necessary to comply with the require-
ments of this subchapter through the issuance of rules or otherwise.
5 U.S.C. § 559 (1976).
21. 435 U.S. at 525, 543. See FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326,
333 (1976); FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309
U.S. 134, 143 (1940); DAvis, supra note 2, § 6:37.
22. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974);
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); United States v.
Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936);
DAvis, supra note 2, § 6:37 (Supp. 1980). But in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975), the
Court based its imposition of additional procedural requirements on the statute, rather than on
common law (called a "cautious approach" by one commentator. W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P.
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Based on concepts of procedural and substantive justice rather than on
statutory provisions, those decisions have become part of the vast ad-
ministrative common law.23 Furthermore, the statement in section 559
that the APA does "not limit or repeal additional requirements im-
posed by statute or otherwise recognized by law" 24 directly contradicts
the extremely limited standard of judicial review applied in Vermont
Yankee.25 In two recent decisions, the Supreme Court failed to recog-
nize these common law and statutory objections to the Vermont Yankee
concept of judicial review.
A. Strycker's Bay and its Misguided Reliance on Vermont Yankee.
1. The decision. In Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen26 the Supreme Court addressed the question whether the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had complied
with the National Environmental Policy Act of 196927 (NEPA) in ap-
proving a local agency's decision to construct a low-income housing
project on the upper west side of Manhattan. A component of the
"West Side Urban Renewal Plan" (the Plan), the project was part of an
attempt to rejuvenate deteriorating neighborhoods "on an integrated
STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CASES AND COMMENTS 366 (7th ed. 1979)). See generally Ga-
gnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (imposition of
additional procedures to protect an individual's fundamental rights).
23. See note 11 supra.
24. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1976)(emphasis added).
25. DAvis, supra note 2, § 6:37 (Supp. 1980). Professor Davis notes that section 12, the pre-
cursor of section 559, "recognized three kinds of law--constitutional law, statutory law, and com-
mon law, and provided that nothing in the APA shall be interpreted to cut back rights that stem
from any one of the three kinds of law. . . . Of course, law that is neither constitutional nor
statutory has to be common law." Id. See note 11 supra.
Section 559 is consistent with the general legislative history of the APA, which shows that the
APA provides minimum, rather than maximum, procedural requirements. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 193, 217, 250 (1946). "The bill. . . is not a specification of the details of adminis-
trative procedure, nor is it a codification of administrative law. Instead, . . . there has been
framed an outline of minimum basic essentials." Id. at 193. Although the APA ensures a modi-
cum of procedural regularity, it was by no means intended to preempt existing law.
The legislative history of section 559 accords with this notion: "Nothing in the bill is to di-
minish constitutional rights or limit or repeal additional requirements of law. The first sentence of
[559] is intended simply to indicate that the act will be interpreted as supplementing constitutional
and legal requirements imposed by existing law." Id. at 215, 281.
Professor Davis also notes that the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee, counsel in that case,
and numerous commentators seemed unaware of the effect or even the existence of section 559.
DAvis, supra note 2, § 6:37 (Supp. 1980). Indeed, judging from the scant case law dealing with
section 559, few have recognized its significance.
26. 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4361 (1976).
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basis both racially and economically." 28 The Plan originally desig-
nated the site at issue, "Site 30," as the future location of a middle-
income housing project. However, upon its determination that there
existed an insufficient number of low-income projects, the New York
City Planning Commission redesignated Site 30 for low-income hous-
ing. HUD approved this change and, in a suit brought by individuals
and a local school to prevent the construction of low-income housing
on Site 30, a federal district court affirmed HUD's decision.29 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that HUD had failed to satisfy
NEPA's requirement that an agency "study, develop, and describe ap-
propriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any propo-
sal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of
available resources."'30 The court stated that in light of the "urban en-
vironmental factors" involved and the substantial, long-term effect that
the housing project would have on the Plan's goal of racial and eco-
nomic integration, the situation required a study in accordance with the
NEPA requirement.31
On remand, HUD compiled a report entitled "Special Environ-
mental Clearance" (the Report) which considered the arguments for
and against committing Site 30 entirely to low-income housing. Al-
though the Report identified two other sites as environmentally supe-
rior to Site 30 for such housing, HUD concluded that the possibility of
a two-year delay resulting from building the low-income project at
either of the alternate sites outweighed the environmental benefits that
would result from such action. Finding that HUD's decision was
"neither arbitrary nor capricious," the district court affirmed. 32
The court of appeals once again reversed the district court. The
court emphasized the "substantive standards" embodied in NEPA, the
dramatic and lasting environmental impact that the project would have
on the neighborhood, and the Report's finding that other sites were
environmentally superior to Site 30 for low-income housing. The court
concluded:
Congress, in authorizing federal aid and creating HUD itself, had
exactly 'social environmental impact' in mind as expressed in
[NEPA] .... Therefore . . . we hold that delay is not to be re-
28. Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'dsub nom. Strycker's Bay Neighbor-
hood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
29. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'dand
remanded, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1976).
31. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1975).
32. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 204, 220 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd and
remandedsub nom. Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1978).
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garded as an overriding factor and that environmental factors, such
as crowding low-income housing into a concentrated area, should be
given determinative weight.33
The Supreme Court reversed in aper curiam opinion. The Court
quoted the Vermont Yankee proposition that NEPA establishes "essen-
tially procedural" requirements. If an agency has fulfilled NEPA's
procedural requirements, the reviewing court's role is restricted to en-
suring that the agency has considered the environmental consequences
of its action.34 In judging whether the agency has "considered" envi-
ronmental factors, a court may not substitute its own preferences for
those of the agency.35 The Court summarily concluded that HUD had
in fact "considered" the environmental implications of its decision and
held that "NEPA requires no more. '36
2. The misapplication of Vermont Yankee. Strycker's Bay is ob-
jectionable for two reasons. First, the Court failed to examine the va-
lidity of HUD's conclusions as set forth in the Special Environmental
Clearance. Generally, a reviewing court must determine whether the
agency's conclusions are "irrational" with regard to the facts and the
relevant statutory criteria.37 The Court's justification for refusing to
engage in this inquiry-reliance on the Vermont Yankee dicta restrict-
ing the scope of judicial review3 8-is the second objection to Strycker's
Bay. Although an agency's decision is entitled to a presumption of
regularity, 39 this presumption by no means excuses a court's failure to
scrutinize the substance of the agency's conclusions.40
Concerning the first objection to Strycker's Bay, the purpose of the
Plan--"to create a racially and economically integrated commu-
nity"4 1-must be emphasized. To achieve the Plan's goals, those select-
ing the sites for middle- and low-income housing projects had to give
33. Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'dsub nom. Strycker's Bay Neigh-
borhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
34. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).
35. Id. at 227-28.
36. Id. at 228.
37. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Wailing for Vermont Yankee II, 55
TuL. L. REv. 418 (1981). The determination of whether the agency's conclusions are "irrational"
comes within the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review even under a limited notion of
that standard. Id. at 422, 423 & n.21. See Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C.
Cir. 1938) (describing proper fact-finding by an agency). The last steps of the fact-finding process
are the agency's inferring "ultimate" facts from the evidence on the basis of statutory language
and then making a decision from the findings that follows statutory criteria. Id. at 559. See gener-
ally Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
38. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).
39. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
40. Id (the presumption should not prevent a "thorough, probing, in-depth review").
41. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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primary consideration to social environmental factors. Locating low-
income housing in neighborhoods already pervaded by similar housing
would frustrate the Plan. No one disputed the character of the neigh-
borhood surrounding Site 30. The court of appeals noted that the
briefs of both parties showed that at least one major street in the area
was "lined with low-income housing. ' 42 Furthermore, HUD itself
found two locations, Sites 9 and 41, environmentally superior to Site 30
for new low-income housing.43 Given the social and environmental
purpose of the Plan, and also given that a low-income housing project,
if built in a low-income neighborhood, would determine the economic
and racial character of the area for the life of the structure,44 HUD's
decision is at best questionable.
The decision is also questionable in light of the "applicable statu-
tory criterion." 45 The broad statements in NEPA mandating responsi-
ble governmental action with respect to the environment 46 demonstrate
not only Congress's desire to protect the environment, but, arguably, a
congressional preference for resolving uncertainty in a manner further-
42. Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'dsub nom. Strycker's Bay Neighbor-
hood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
43. Id. at 42.
44. Id. at 44. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (1976) (requiring the federal government
to use resources "as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations").
45. Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir. 1938). See note 37 supra and
accompanying text.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976). Subsection (b) of section 4331 provides:
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter[ policies and goals of NEPAl,
it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable
means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and
coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation
may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and cultur-
ally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degrada-
tion, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heri-
tage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and va-
riety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high
standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attaina-
ble recycling of depletable resources.
42 U.S.C. § 4332 requires that the "policies, regulations, and public laws of the United
States" be interpreted and applied to conform with NEPA. That section also provides that all
agencies develop methods and procedures for furthering environmental goals, prepare detailed
environmental impact statements for any action substantially affecting the environment, and study
and describe alternatives to decisions that involve unresolved issues concerning the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(B),(C),(E). 42 U.S.C. § 4333 requires agencies to review their existing-policies
and procedures to ensure that they implement environmental goals. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1976).
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ing environmental goals. 47 Despite suggestions to the contrary in
Strycker's Bay,48 NEPA does embody significant substantive criteria.49
Furthermore, "NEPA litigation with substantive aims rarely pro-
ceeds without the supporting presence of complementary federal legis-
lation supplying an unmistakeable substantive component." 50  If
NEPA's substantive provisions, standing alone, failed to provide the
statutory criteria for judging the rationality of HUD's decision, then
the Fair Housing Act provided the added substantive component nec-
essary to compel substantive, as well as procedural, review.5' The
Court's failure to examine the substance of HUD's conclusions violates
the precept that a court must examine an agency's determinations in
light of the context and purpose of the applicable statutes.5 2
The second objection to Strycker's Bay is the Court's justification
for refusing to examine the substantive validity of HUD's decision.
The Court resorted to the broad dicta of Vermont Yankee that discour-
ages active judicial review.53 Reliance on Vermont Yankee is mis-
guided for two reasons: first, the actual holding of Vermont Yankee is
47. Trubek, Allocating the Burden ofEnvironmental Uncertainty: The NRC Interprets NEPA's
Substantive Mandate, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 747, 748, 763; cf. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural
Discretion in Administrative Resolution ofScience Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA
and OSHA, 67 GEO. LJ. 729, 784 (1979) (contending that the Occupational Safety and Health
Act's broad statements advocating employee safety indicate congressional intent that agencies
should err on the side of safety).
48. 444 U.S. at 227-28.
49. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 558 (1978) ("NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation. .. ");
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409-10 (1976); Rodgers supra note 8, at 708 nn.75 & 76, 710.
For examples of these substantive criteria, see note 40 supra.
50. Rodgers, supra note 8, at 710-11. Professor Rodgers cites Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), as a significant example of this phenomenon. Plaintiffs in
that case based their winning arguments on NEPA and the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 18(a), 82 Stat. 823 (1968) (current version at 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1976)).
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3608 (1976). In Karlen v. Harris, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit recognized the force that the Fair Housing Act adds to NEPA, stating:
An additional source of the affirmative duty to integrate is found in the 1968 Fair Hous-
ing Act ... which provides that "[i]t is the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States," 42 U.S.C.
§ 3601 and, in § 3608, that "(d) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall
... (5) administer the programs and activities relating to housing and urban develop-
ment in a manner affirmatively to further the policies of this sub-chapter."
590 F.2d at 45 (quoting Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133 (2d Cir. 1973).
This argument assumes that segregated housing results in unequal housing. The Supreme Court's
reasoning in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was based on a
similar assumption.
52. See NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 325 (1951).
53. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980). In
Stryckers' Bay the Court quoted from and relied heavily on Vermont Yankee. It stated that
"NEPA ... imposes upon agencies duties that are 'essentially procedural.'... [Olnce an agency
has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to
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narrow; and second, the Strycker's Bay Court distorted both the hold-
ing and dicta of Vermont Yankee.
The narrowness of the Vermont Yankee holding is demonstrated
by the Court's own view of the issue presented in that case. Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the Court: "After a thorough exmaination of the
[lower court] opinion itself, we conclude that while the matter is not
entirely free from doubt, the majority of the Court of Appeals struck
down the rule because of the perceived inadequacies of the procedures
employed in the rulemaking proceedings. ' 54 Thus, the Vermont Yan-
kee Court treated the issue as one of procedure, and the broad state-
ments restricting judicial review should be read in light of the narrow
procedural context of the case.: 5
In contrast, Strycker's Bay presented a primarily substantive ques-
tion, namely, whether HUD's approval of Site 30 for low-income hous-
ing was "arbitrary or capricious" with regard to NEPA. The Court
demanded that the agency "consider" the relevant environmental fac-
tors but reduced "consideration" to a procedural requirement. HUD's
mere presentation of the Special Environmental Clearance report satis-
fied the Court. However, "consideration" involves the qualitative
weighing of facts and conclusions. To ensure that an agency has actu-
ally "considered" environmental factors, the court itself must examine
the reasonableness of the agency's conclusions. In Strycker's Bay, the
Court made no such inquiry; in asserting that Vermont Yankee was
controlling, the Court reduced NEPA's requirement of qualitative con-
sideration of environmental factors to a requirement that the agency
merely note the existence of arguments opposing its conclusion.
56
In sum, given the very different contexts and issues of the two
cases, Vermont Yankee was of limited relevance to Strycker's Bay. By
misconstruing the holding of Vermont Yankee, the Strycker's Bay
Court perpetuated the most dangerous implications of Vermont Yan-
kee. Vermont Yankee's derogation of administrative common law and
failure to consider section 559 prompted many critics to predict that the
insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences... ' d. at 227. See note
12 supra for the Vermont Yankee dicta explicitly restricting the scope of judicial review.
54. 435 U.S. at 540-41.
55. DAvis, supra note 2, §§ 6:35-6:36. Commentators praised the holding that formal proce-
dures normally need not be used in note and comment rulemaking proceedings. E.g. DAVIS,
supra note 2, § 6:37 ("The Court's main accomplishment... was probably the further strength-
ening of the law that trial procedure (what the Court called 'adjudicatory procedure') is generally
undesirable for rulemaking").




case would have limited effect.5 7 Whether Vermont Yankee repre-
sented a tendency to refrain from probing substantive and procedural
review was unclear.58 In uncritically applying Vermont Yankee to
Strycker's Bay, the Court disregarded both the hard-look doctrine and
passages of Vermont Yankee that demand substantive review under
NEPA.5 9 As a result, the Court limited substantive judicial review of
administrative decisions beyond even the narrow Vermont Yankee con-
cept of review.
B. Steadman v. SEC: The Court's Failure to Follow the Letter and
Spirit of Section 559.
Steadman v. SEC60 further demonstrates the Supreme Court's
willingness to afford extreme deference to agency procedures and de-
terminations. In Steadman, the Court upheld the Security and Ex-
change Commission's use of a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
of proof in proceedings concerning alleged antifraud violations. Un-
like Strycker's Bay, the Court's decision in Steadman apparently relied
little on the restrictive judicial-review dicta of Vermont Yankee. None-
theless, the same attitude and analysis that produced Vermont Yankee
and Strycker's Bay also fashioned Steadman. As in the two earlier
cases, the Court in Steadman failed to consider section 559 and conse-
quently neglected common law principles vital to the correct resolution
of the case.
Steadman involved a proceeding pursuant to section 9(b) of the
Investment Company Act of 194061 and section 203(f) of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940.62 The SEC found by a preponderance of
57. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. See also DAVIS, supra note 2, § 6:36.
58. See Verkuil, supra note 37, at 424.
59. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 229-31 (1980) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558
(1978).
60. 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b) (1976). Section 9(b) provides that the SEC may, in certain
circumstances,
after notice and opportunity for hearing. . . prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally,
either permanently or for such period of time as it in its discretion shall deem appropn-
ate in the public interest, any person from serving or acting as an employee, officer,
director, member of an advisory board, investment adviser or depositor of, or principal
underwriter for, a registered investment company or affiliated person of such investment
adviser, depositor, or principal underwriter ....
Id
62. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(f) (1976). That section provides that the Commission, after notice and
opportunity for hearing on the record, may "censure or place limitations on the activities of any,
person associated or seeking to become associated with an investment adviser, or suspend for a
period not exceeding twelve months or bar any such person from being associated with an invest-
ment adviser."
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the evidence that petitioner Steadman had violated the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws.63 As a result, the Commission per-
manently barred Steadman from the securities profession, forced him
to sell the stock of his corporation at a significant loss, and prohibited
him from associating with any securities broker or dealer for one
year.64 Steadman appealed on the ground that such severe penalties
required the SEC to prove its allegations of fraud by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the Commission's use of
the less demanding standard of proof.65
The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that a court must abide by
the "rules of evidence and standards of proof" that Congress prescribes
for administrative proceedings. 66 After analyzing the language and
legislative history of section 556(d) of the APA,67 the Court held that
Congress had established "preponderance of the evidence" as the stan-
63. The provisions violated were 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b), 80b-6(1)-(2) (1976).
64. 450 U.S. at 94 & n.8.
65. Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979). The Steadman decision conflicted with
two cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Whitney v. SEC,
604 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Collins Securities Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
66. 450 U.S. at 95.
67. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the burden
of proof. Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as a matter
of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitions
evidence. A sanction may not be imposed or rule or order issued except on consideration
of the whole record or those parts thereof cited by a party and supported by and in
accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.
The Steadman Court interpreted "substantial evidence" as requiring that a sanction must rest on a
"minimum quantity of evidence." 450 U.S. at 98 (emphasis in original). Furthermore,
[t]he additional words "in accordance with" suggest that the adjudicating agency must
weigh the evidence and decide, based on the weight of the evidence, whether a discipli-
nary order should be issued. The language of [section 566(d)], therefore, requires that the
agency decision must be "in accordance with" the weight of the evidence. . . . Obvi-
ously, weighing evidence has relevance only if the evidence on each side is to be mea-
sured against a standard of proof which allocates the risk of error.
450 U.S. at 99 (footnotes omitted).
Although the statute itself failed to suggest the applicable standard, the legislative history
furnished guidance. "Where there is evidence pro and con, the agency must weigh it and decide
in accordance with the preponderance." H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1946). But
see note 74 infra.
The SEC's consistent use of this standard of proof in antifraud proceedings further supports
the Court's decision to uphold the Commission's practice. 450 U.S. at 103-04. See In re Cea, 44
S.E.C. 8, 25 (1969); In re Pollisky, 43 S.E.C. 458, 459-60 (1967); In re White, 3 S.E.C. 466, 539-40
(1938). See generaly E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46,54-55 (1977) (a review-
ing court must follow a consistent administrative construction of a statute "'unless there are com-
pelling indications that it is wrong!" (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
381 (1969))).
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dard applicable in proceedings governed by section 556(d). 68
Because the sanctions imposed on Steadman resulted in substan-
tial injury to both his reputation and his property, his argument for the
more rigorous standard of proof had merit. Criminal penalties such as
fines or probation may be imposed only if the evidence satisfies the
reasonable-doubt standard, but the SEC imposed much more injurious
penalties on the petitioner even though the evidence might have raised
significant doubts concerning his guilt.69 On its face, however, the
Court's statutory argument appeared to preclude any consideration of
policy. Embodying as it did the congressional will, the statute seem-
ingly rendered "inapposite" Steadman's policy arguments.70
In construing section 556(d) as it pertains to SEC antifraud pro-
ceedings, however, the Court failed to consider the implications of sec-
tion 559. Section 559 states that the APA does not "limit or repeal
additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by
law." 71 As Justice Powell recognized in his dissent, Steadman based his
policy arguments on the common law of fraud.72 Because sanctions im-
.posed for fraud are so harsh, those attempting to prove fraud must do
so by clear and convincing evidence-they, rather than the accused
who has so much at stake, bear the risk of error.73 Congress, by enact-
ing section 556(d), neither limited nor repealed the common law re-
quirement that clear and convincing evidence be offered to prove
fraud. By virtue of section 559, the specific common law rule preempts
the general, less demanding provision of the APA. Congress did not
intend to supplant the common law standard of proof when it enacted
the Investment Company Act or the Investment Advisers Act. Al-
though Justice Powell failed to recognize the significance of section
559, that section supports his conclusion that "[i]n the absence of any
68. 450 U.S. at 95-102 (1981). For another example of the Court's deference to the SEC, see
Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
69. 450 U.S. at 105-06 (Powell, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 96 n.10.
71. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1976). The term "otherwise recognized by law" includes the common
law. See notes 11 and 25 supra.
72. "Sanctions imposed under these sections are the functional equivalent of penalties for
fraud. At common law, it was plain that allegations of fraud had to be proved by clear and
convincing evidence." 450 U.S. at 105 (Powell, J., dissenting). See generally Note, The Burden of
Proof in SEC Disciplinary Proceedings: Preponderance and Beyond, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 642
(1981) (arguing that the severe fraud penalties imposed by the SEC require the "clear and con-
vincing" standard of proof as a matter of procedural due process).
73. See, eg., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,424 (1979) (dicta); Woodby v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285 n.18 (1966); Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co., 359
I. 584, 598, 195 N.E. 420, 426 (1935); Bank of Pocahontas v. Ferimer, 161 Va. 37, 40-41, 170 S.E.
591, 592 (1933) ("clear and satisfactory"); Bowe v. Gage, 127 Wis. 245, 251, 106 N.W. 1074, 1076
(1906) ("clear and satisfactory").
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specific demonstration of Congress' purpose, we should not assume
that Congress intended the SEC to apply a lower standard of proof
than the prevailing common law standard for similar allegations.
'74
By acquiescing in the SEC's "preponderance of the evidence"
standard of proof, the Supreme Court perpetuated Vermont Yankee's
failure to recognize that section 559 integrates the common law into the
APA. In Steadman, unlike in Vermont Yankee, a specific common law
rule applied directly to the issue. Therefore, the Steadman Court's fail-
ure to consider the common law is even more inexcusable than the
Court's unnecessary and inaccurate dicta in Vermont Yankee.
75
In addition, relying expressly on Vermont Yankee, the Court held
that the "preponderance" standard applies to all proceedings governed
by section 556(d).7 6 This holding is clearly overbroad if section 559 is
to have any meaning. By providing that constitutional, statutory, and
common law pertaining to the subject matter should apply notwith-
standing section 556(d), section 559 shows that a preponderance of the
evidence standard of proof may well not satisfy the statute.
C. Deference to Agency Determinations." Other Cases.
Other recent Supreme Court cases dealing with agency action em-
body the limited scope of review found in Strycker's Bay and
Steadman. In FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California77 the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) charged that Standard had engaged in un-
fair and deceptive commercial practices.78 Standard sued to compel
dismissal of the FTC complaint, alleging that the FTC had no "reason
to believe" that the company had violated the law.79 Reversing the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that
the decision to issue a complaint is not reviewable. The Court charac-
terized the FTC complaint as a mere threshold determination, rather
than a final agency decision.80 Judicial review of preliminary agency
action such as the complaint at issue would interfere with the agency's
74. 450 U.S. at 106 (Powell, J., dissenting). One brief isolated statement in the legislative
history of section 556(d) does call for a decision "in accordance with the preponderance." See
note 62 supra. The Court should have discussed whether Congress manifested a specific intention
to override the common law and the unequivocal statutory provisions of section 559 by this brief,
isolated statement in the legislative history.
75. See notes 12, 19-25 supra and accompanying text.
76. 450 U.S. at 104.
77. 449 U.S. 232 (1980).
78. Id. at 243 & n.2 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
79. 449 U.S. at 235.
80. Id. at 238.
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proper function.8' The Court yielded to this pragmatic consideration
at the cost of rendering the FTC's action virtually unreviewable. 82
Haig v. Agee 3 presents another example of the Court's growing
tendency to defer to agency action. Agee, a former agent of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), began in 1974 a campaign to expose CIA
agents and officers. In 1979 the Secretary of State revoked Agee's pass-
port pursuant to a regulation allowing such action if the traveller's "ac-
tivities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the
national security or the foreign policy of the United States."'84
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and upheld the Sec-
retary's action. The controlling cases, Zemel v. Rusk 85 and Kent v. Dul-
les,86 dictated that the Secretary show Congress had approved the
regulation either by express delegation or by implied approval of a sub-
stantial and consistent administrative practice.87 Although the Secre-
tary could point to fewer than six passport revocations based on
national security,88 the Court found that Congress had acquiesced in
the Secretary's consistent interpretation of the applicable statute89 and
its precursors.90 The dissent argued that Zemel and Kent's requirement
of a substantial and consistent practice was not satisfied by mere statu-
tory construction. 91 Although the literal language of those cases in fact
called for consistent administrative practice, 92 the Court deferred to the
Secretary's broad reading of Zemel and Kent.
New legislation could dramatically reverse the Court's increasing
deference to agency determinations. Two senate bills amend section
706 of the APA by requiring that the reviewing court make no pre-
sumption in favor of agencies on questions of law.93 These revolution-
ary bills, if passed, would drastically undercut the principle that courts
must generally defer to agencies.
81. Id. at 242.
82. Id. at 249 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
83. 101 S.Ct. 2766 (1981).
84. 22 CFR § 51.70(b)(4) (1981).
85. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
86. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
87. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4872.
88. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4875.
89. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1976).
90. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4872-75.
91. Id. at 4878-80, 4880 nn.9 & 10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 124-25 (1958).
93. S. 67. 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); S.1080. 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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II. THE COTTON DUST CASE: SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY, COST
BENEFIT ANALYSIS, AND THE NEED FOR CLEAR
EXPRESSION OF CONGRESSIONAL POLICY
In American Textile M1anufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan (Cot-
ton Dust),94 the Supreme Court resolved a question presented in the
preceding term by Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute (Benzene).95 The Court held in Cotton Dust that
section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the
Act) 96 does not require the Secretary of Labor to show a reasonable
relationship between costs and benefits in issuing regulations to limit
exposure to toxic substances. In upholding the agency's conclusions
and statutory construction, the Court conformed with the deferential
attitude described in Part I of this note.
97
A. The Cost-Benft Question.
In the Benzene case, the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA), pursuant to section 6(b)(5) of the Act, had promul-
gated standards that lowered the permissible employee exposure to
benzene from ten parts benzene per million parts of air (ppm) to one
ppm. The Court struck down the standards but declined to decide
whether OSHA must demonstrate that the benefits of such a health
standard are worth its costs. The Court based its decision on OSHA's
failure to meet the threshold showing imposed by section 3(8),98 that an
exposure of 10 ppm of benzene constitutes a significant health threat.99
94. 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981).
95. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
96. Occupational Safety and Health Act § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). Section
6(b)(5) provides:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately as-
sures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee
will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee
has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his
working life.
97. See notes 19-76 supra and accompanying text.
98. Occupational Safety and Health Act § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976). Section 3(8) pro-
vides: "The term occupational safety and health standard means a standard which requires condi-
tions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes,
reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment."
99. The Benzene Court held that its construction of section 3(8) mooted the question of
agency cost-benefit analysis:
§ 3(8) requires the Secretary to find, as a threshold matter, that the toxic substance
in question poses a significant health risk in the workplace and that a new, lower stan-
dard is therefore "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful em-
ployment and places of employment." Unless and until such a finding is made, it is not
necessary to address the further question whether the Court of Appeals correctly held
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OSHA had merely assumed that some health impairment might be pre-
vented by lowering the exposure limits; it offered no empirical data di-
rectly supporting its conclusion. Furthermore, in formulating the new
standard, the agency had neglected to solicit comments whether the ex-
isting 10 ppm standard constituted a significant health threat. 100 Be-
cause it concerned the factual heart of the case, this procedural lapse
was a strong additional reason for striking down the new regulations.101
The plurality found that OSHA had failed even to attempt to support
its conclusions with substantial evidence. 102
In contrast to the preexisting levels of exposure at issue in the Ben-
zene case, exposure to cotton dust manifestly constituted a significant
health threat in the workplace. The large number of workers afflicted
with byssinosis10 3 was expressly cited as one reason for passage of the
Act.1 4 In addition, OSHA supported its finding that cotton dust
presented a significant health hazard with considerable empirical
data.10 5
Thus, with the threshold requirement of section 3(8) satisfied,10 6
the question of whether section 6(b)(5) required cost-benefit analysis
faced the Court. OSHA had construed the Act as requiring the adop-
tion of the most protective standard possible, limited only by the eco-
that there must be a reasonable correlation between costs and benefits, or whether...
the Secretary is.. . required by § 6(b)(5) to promulgate a standard that goes as far as
technologically and economically possible to eliminate the risk.
448 U.S. at 614-15.
100. 448 U.S. at 634; Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475-76 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
What we are entitled to at all events is a careful identification by the Secretary...
of the reasons why he chooses to follow one course rather than another.. . . [Wihen the
Secretary is obliged to make policy judgments where no factual certainties exist or where
facts alone do not provide the answer, he should so state and go on to identify the con-
siderations he found persuasive.
499 F.2d at 475-76. See generally Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d
584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("Courts should require administrative officers to articulate the stan-
dards and principles that govern their discretionary decisions in as much detail as possible").
101. 448 U.S. at 623. This aspect of the case supports the observation that "agency decisions
mandating reduced exposure to carcinogens are quite vulnerable on procedural grounds." Mc-
Garity, supra note 47, at 753. See Pactra Indus. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm., 555 F.2d 677,
684 (9th Cir. 1977); Spring Mills, Inc. v. CPSC, 434 F. Supp. 416,428 (D.S.C. 1977). See also Hess
& Clark, Div. of Rhodia, Inc. v. FDA, 495 F.2d 975, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
102. 448 U.S. at 653.
103. "Byssinosis, known in its more severe manifestations as 'brown lung' disease, is a serious
and potentially disabling respiratory disease primarily caused by the inhalation of cotton dust."
101 S. Ct. at 2483 (footnote omitted).
104. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970), reprinted/n [1971] U.S. CODE CoN . &
AD. NEws 5177, 5179. See Cotton Dust, 101 S. Ct. at 2482. The Benzene plurality itself noted this
fact. 448 U.S. at 646.
105. 101 S. Ct. at 2487, 2488 n.25.
106. See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
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nomic and technological capabilities of the industry. 10 7 Petitioners-
representatives of the textile industry-urged that the costs of health
standards formulated pursuant to section 6(b)(5) must be reasonable in
light of the expected benefits.108 As in Steadman v. SEC,10 9 the Court
began its analysis by focusing on the language of the statute. The
words "to the extent feasible" implied that the health standards must
protect employee health so far as the prescribed undertaking is " 'capa-
ble of being done.' " 10 This language demonstrated that Congress had
already balanced the costs and benefits: "Congress itself defined the
basic relationship between costs and benefits, by placing the 'benefit' of
worker health above all other considerations save those making attain-
ment of this 'benefit' unachievable."' 1 In addition, although section
3(8) set forth the general criteria for developing health and safety stan-
dards, section 6(b)(5) set forth specific, additional requirements for a
subcategory of health standards directed at toxic materials. Therefore,
even if section 3(8) could be construed as mandating cost-benefit analy-
sis, the specific provisions of section 6(b)(5) override that mandate with
stricter standards for toxic materials. 1 2
Moving to the second step of its analysis, the Court examined the
Act's legislative history and found "general support" for OSHA's inter-
pretation. The Court could find nothing expressly calling for a cost-
benefit analysis; the absence of such statements indicated a congres-
sional intent that cost-benefit analysis not be used. 1 3 Indeed, the only
consideration of cost in the history, the language "to the extent feasi-
ble", does not require employers to make the workplace absolutely
safe. 114
B. The Question of Cost of Compliance. Deference to Agency
Determinations.
OSHA's determinations concerning the cost of implementation
and the economic feasibility of the new standard presented the Court
with a close substantive question. After examining two economic feasi-
bility analyses, OSHA adopted the industry-sponsored Hocutt-Thomas
107. 101 S. Ct. at 2487.
108. Id. at 2489.
109. 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
110. Cotton Dust, 101 S. Ct. at 2490 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1976)).
111. 101 S.Ct. at 2490.
112. Id at 2492; accord Benzene, 448 U.S. at 642-43.
113. Cotton Dust, 101 S. Ct. at 2493-97.
114. See, eg., id. at 2494-97; S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1970), reprinted in
[1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5222-23.
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study, with some reservations. 115  OSHA found that the Hocutt-
Thomas study overestimated the cost of complying with the regulations
by overestimating the number of renovations the industry would need
to undertake. However, OSHA also noted that the study based its esti-
mated costs on standards less stringent than the standards actually
promulgated. 1 6 In deciding whether the study constituted "substantial
evidence"117 in support of the standard, the Court strictly limited its
review. Not only did the Court recognize its general duty to defer to
the agency, it also noted that because the statute vested responsibility
for determining substantial evidence questions in the courts of appeals,
the Court should reverse only when the lower court had "grossly mis-
applied" the substantial-evidence standard.11 8
The result confirms the Court's deferential stance. The Court up-
held the appellate court's finding that the flawed Hocutt-Thomas study
met the substantial-evidence standard, noting both the refusal of the
textile industry to make available much relevant data 1 9 and the "in-
herent crudeness" of estimation tools.' 20 Furthermore, the Court re-
115. Cotton Dust at 2497-99 & nn.40-48.
116. Id at 2498-99.
117. It is important to note the standard of review under which the Court acted. The statute
provides that a court must uphold agency regulations if "substantial evidence" supports the rule,
29 U.S.C. § 655(F) (1976). In Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938), the
Supreme Court stated that "[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id at
229.
Traditionally, this standard has been applied to formal rulemaking or adjudication, see In-
dustrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974), and at times has been held
to require that an agency use formal procedure in the absence of other statutory procedural direc-
tives. See Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185, 218-22 (1974).
However, the Occupational Safety and Health Act explicitly calls for informal rulemaking, 29
U.S.C. § 655(b)(2)-(4) (1976). The substantial-evidence standard was added to the statute as a
compromise to compensate for the deletion of formal rulemaking requirements. H.R. REP. No.
1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 34-5, reprintedin [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5228, 5230-31.
One commentator submits that the Act manifests a general congressional policy favoring
employee health over cost effectiveness. McGarity, supra note 47, at 784. However, to the extent
that OSHA may be forced to regulate in the absence of precise factual determinations, the sub-
stantial-evidence standard suggests that OSHA should not venture too far beyond the point of
uncertainty in fulfilling the general policy of the Act. "Although the 'substantial evidence' stan-
dard does not set precise limits on the uncertainty underlying agency factfinding, its presence...
at the very least implies a congressional reaffirmation of the policy favoring accuracy in agency
decisionmaking." Id. at 792 (footnote omitted). "ITihe agency is free to use conservative assump-
tions in interpreting the data with respect to carcinogens, risking error on the side of over-protec-
tion rather than under-protection." Benzene, 448 U.S. at 656. (emphasis added).
118. 101 S. Ct. at 2497 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,491 (1951)).
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283, 292, 310 (1974); FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S.
396, 400-01 (1958). The Benzene plurality made no mention of this deference principle.
119. 101 S. Ct. at 2499-500.
120. Id. at 2500 n.54.
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fused to hold that, as a matter of law, the absence of a study exploring
the compliance costs of the standard finally adopted constituted
grounds for reversal.1 21 Conceivably, this serious inadequacy could
have provided a rationale for striking down the standard. Thus, the
Court's refusal to find OSHA's evidence insubstantial, even though
some basis for doing so existed, reflects the Court's growing tendency to
defer in practice as well as in theory to agency determinations.
122
C. Scientfc Uncertainty and the Necessity For Clear Policy
Guidelines.
Both Benzene and Cotton Dust demonstrate the difficulties that un-
resolved scientific questions pose for a reviewing court. The issue in
each case involved "scientific uncertainty"123-although scientific evi-
dence shows conclusively that certain levels of exposure to benzene and
to cotton dust create an appreciable risk of health impairment, no such
evidence exists concerning the hazards to health created by exposure at
the levels established by the new standards. A cost-benefit construction
of section 6(b)(5) would have prohibited OSHA from setting levels of
exposure that result in insufficiently demonstrable reduction of risk. In
contrast, the "feasibility" construction adopted by the Court requires
that any risk to employee health must be eliminated, within economic
and technological limits. The two constructions embody fundamental
policy differences: the cost benefit approach allows some impairment
of employee health even where the danger could be prevented; the fea-
sibility approach requires that employee health be protected beyond
the point of cost-effectiveness.
Leaving this fundamental policy decision to administrators or
courts would be an unconstitutional delegation of Congress' legislative
power. Although agencies and courts necessarily make policy determi-
nations, 124 the Constitution demands that Congress establish the fun-
121. Id at 2500. The Court did concede that "a cost estimate based on the standard actually
promulgated surely would be preferable . I.." "d. The dissent demanded a study based on the
adopted standards. Id. at 2507 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
The Court relied heavily on the "'best available evidence" language of 6(b)(5) in its treat-
ment of the study's deficiencies. This reliance is one reason the Court emphasized the industry's
refusal to turn over relevant evidence for study. Id. at 2500. The Benzene plurality also recog-
nized the "'best available evidence"' language when it stated that "OSHA is not required to
support its finding that a significant risk exists with anything approaching scientific certainty."
448 U.S. at 656.
122. See notes 16-19q supra and accompanying text.
123. 448 U.S. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
124. "Fundamentally, our system is not and never has been one of relying exclusively upon
the legislative department for all development of policy. The executive and judicial branches of
the government are and must be coordinate branches not only for carrying out policies determined
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damental guidelines within which the executive or the judiciary must
act.125 Relying on this principle, Justice Rehnquist urged the Court to
strike down section 6(b)(5) in both Benzene and Cotton Dust.t26 In
Benzene Rehnquist conceded that the nondelegation doctrine has been
discredited,127 but he correctly argued that even the cases denigrating
the doctrine have left enough of it intact to require that Congress estab-
lish the basic policy to be followed when an agency faces an unresolved
scientific question. 28 "In drafting 6(b)(5), Congress was faced with a
clear, if difficult, choice between balancing statistical lives and indus-
trial resources or authorizing the Secretary to elevate human life above
all concerns save massive dislocation in an affected industry.' 29 Jus-
tice Rehnquist believed Congress had relinquished that choice by in-
serting the amorphous phrase "to the extent feasible" into section
6(b)(5).1 30 In short, Congress had enacted no standard, allowing
OSHA free reign and thus violating the constitutional mandate for sep-
aration of powers.
Justice Rehnquist thought the Court's construction of section
6(b)(5) in Cotton Dust perpetuated this constitutional flaw. He inter-
preted the opinion as allowing cost-benefit analysis under 6(b)(5), but
not demanding it.13 1 Under that rule OSHA, without guidance from
Congress, would make "a fundamental and most difficult policy
choice-whether and to what extent 'the statistical possibility of future
deaths should ...be disregarded in light of the economic costs of
preventing those deaths.' "132
by the legislative branch but also for determining basic policy." DAVIS, supra note 2, § 3:7. See
Benzene, 448 U.S. at 673-75 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
125. "I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions." Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205, 221 (1916) (Holmes, J. dissenting); see McGarity, supra note 47, at 784.
126. 448 U.S. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgement). For two cases in which the
Court invalidated statutes as unconstitutional delegations of the legislative power, see Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388
(1935). Considerable doubt exists as to whether these cases are still good law. See note 127 infra
and accompanying text.
127. E.g., FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976); United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968); American
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Atchison, T.&S.F.RY., 387 U.S. 397 (1967); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S.
245 (1947); DAvis, supra note 2, § 3:6 ("That major governmental policy is often made without
significant statutory guidance is such a commonplace proposition that three hundred examples
could easily be given from cases decided by the Supreme Court").
128. 448 U.S. at 674-75 (Rebnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
129. Id. at 685.
130. "That Congress chose, intentionally or unintentionally, to pass this difficult choice on to
the Secretary is evident from the spectral quality of the standard it selected. . . ." Id.
131. Cotton Diat, 101 S. Ct. at 2508 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 2509.
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Had the Cotton Dust majority so construed section 6(b)(5), Justice
Rehnquist's nondelegation argument should have prevailed. The
choice between cost-benefit and feasibility analysis-involving as it
does a determination of the relative importance of money and human
lives-is indeed a fundamental policy decision. However, the majority
expressly discounted Justice Rehnquist's reading of its opinion. 33 The
Court held that section 6(b)(5) requires OSHA to limit employee expo-
sure to cotton dust to the extent that such a reduction is feasible or, in
other words, to a point bounded only by unavoidable technological and
economic limitations. The Court based this interpretation on a reason-
able reading of the plain words of the statute. Given the dictionary
meaning of "feasible,"' 134 the phrase "to the extent feasible" leaves little
room for injecting a cost-benefit element into the statute. Admittedly,
both the statute and the legislative history could describe more clearly
the policy Congress intended. However, even if a law can reasonably
be construed as providing for an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive power to an agency, precedents show that a court may render the
delegation constitutional by construing narrowly the discretion granted
the agency. 35 If section 6(b)(5) was intended to require a cost-benefit
approach, the Court so narrowed the agency's discretion.
III. FCC v. WNCN LISTENERS GUILD: DEFERENCE AND
DEREGULATION
A. The Decision.
FCC v. WINCN Listeners Guild 36 is the latest in a series of cases
stemming from the tension between the need for government regula-
tion of the broadcast industry 137 and the principle that broadcasting is
a free enterprise governed largely by a competitive market.138 Specifi-
cally, the Court decided in WATCN that the Federal Communications
Commission, in renewing a radio station's license, need not consider
the station's change in entertainment programming despite events indi-
cating that the change fails to serve the "public interest, convenience,
133. Id. at 2506 n.75.
134. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
135. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); DAvis, supra note 2, § 3:13.
136. 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
137. See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978);
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
138. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,475 (1940); Federal Communica-
tions Act, 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
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and necessity. ' 139 In a series of cases decided in the 1970s,140 the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the public-
interest standard comprehends changes in entertainment programming.
The court held that events such as significant public protest against a
change in entertainment format constituteprimafacie evidence that the
change fails to serve the public interest. On a showing of such evi-
dence, the court further held that section 309(d)(1) of the Federal Com-
munications Act (the Act)141 requires the FCC to conduct a hearing to
determine the merits of the change. 142 This construction of the Act,
labelled the "format doctrine," was applied only grudgingly by the
FCC.143
In 1976, pursuant to its rulemaking authority, 144 the FCC sought
comments on and inquired into its role in the review of entertainment-
format changes.145 As a result of this study, the Commission issued a
Memorandum Opinion and Order (the Order)146 in which it rejected
the format doctrine. The FCC found that the Act requires no review of
139. 450 U.S. at 604; Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 309(a) (1976). That section
provides:
Subject to the provisions of this section, the Commission shall determine, in the case of
each application filed with it to which section 308 of this title applies, whether the public
interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by the granting of such application,
and, if the Commission, upon examination of such application and upon consideration
of such other matters as the Commission may officially notice, shall find that public
interest, convenience, and necessity would be served by the granting thereof, it shall
grant such application.
Section 309(d)(1) provides that any party in interest may petition the Commission to deny an
application for license transfer or renewal, but the petition must contain specific allegations of fact
sufficient to show that granting the application would be "prima facie inconsistent" with the pub-
lic interest.
140. Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc); Citi-
zens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lakewood Broad-
casting Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Citizens Comm. to Preserve the Voice of
Arts v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also Hartford Communications Comm. v. FCC,
467 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
141. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
142. "[W]here a significant sector of the listening community, in opposition to the assignment
[or renewal of the station's license], protests the loss of such a format by substantial factual allega-
tions that it is both unique and financially viable, the statute requires that the Commission hold a
hearing." WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd,
450 U.S. 582 (1981). The court stressed that "the Commission's obligation to consider format
issues arises only when there is strong prima facie evidence that the market has in fact broken
down." If there exists a substitute in the area for the abandoned entertainment format, public
protest is weak, supporters of the format are few or it is not financially feasible to continue the
format, then "[n]o public interest issue is raised .... [G]enerally the existence vet non of these
factors can be determined without the need for a hearing." Id. at 851.
143. Id at 849-50.
144. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976).
145. Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 57 F.C.C.2d 580 (1976).
146. 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976), reconsideration denied, 66 F.C.C.2d 78 (1977).
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entertainment-format changes, that such review engenders serious ad-
ministrative problems, and that it stifles experimentation in radio pro-
gramming. Emphasizing free-market philosophy, the FCC took the
position that competition, rather than government regulation, is the
best means of achieving variety in entertainment formats. 147
A number of citizens groups wishing to preserve certain entertain-
ment formats petitioned the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit for review of the Order. The court struck down the
Order, although it agreed with the FCC that, as a rule, market forces
generate so many different formats that one station's alteration of its
entertainment programming does not harm the public interest.'48 The
court also recognized, however, that the radio market falls short of per-
fectly reflecting listener preferences. Owing to the dynamics of adver-
tising, the preferences of those groups with large incomes tend to
outweigh the desires of less influential groups such as children and the
elderly.149 Stations catering to high-income groups may frustrate the
Act's goal of securing "the maximum benefits of radio to all the people
of the United States."'150 Thus, when public protest signals that the
market has failed to meet listener preferences, the FCC must investi-
gate whether a station's format change in fact conflicts with the public
interest.
Supreme Court cases dealing with rulemaking and other action by
the FCC call for substantial deference to the Commission.' 5' WNCN
followed this tradition of deference. The Court required only that the
FCC provide "a rational explanation" to support its argument that free
competition is the best means of achieving diversity in entertainment
formats.152 Given the broad discretion afforded the FCC by Congress
in deciding what serves the public interest, courts must refrain from
147. 60 F.C.C.2d at 862-66.
148. 610 F.2d at 851; see note 115 supra.
149. 610 F.2d at 851.
150. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943).
151. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Storer Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 351 U.S. 192 (1956); FCC v.
WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
152. 450 U.S. at 595-96. Accord FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.
775, 802-03 (1978) (the FCC's interpretation and resulting regulations must be upheld if not irra-
tional). Like WNCN, National Citizens involved regulations based on the FCC's experienced
judgment, rather than on hard empirical data. The Court found the regulations reasonable, de-
spite the lack of empirical evidence, because of a waiver provision which would ameliorate ad-
verse consequences if the Commission's judgment proved wrong. The FCC's entertainment-
format rules considered in WfNCN, however, contain no waiver provision. See notes 134-41 infra
and accompanying text.
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substituting their own opinions for those of the agency. The Supreme
Court found that the court of appeals had effected such a substitution.
The FCC and the court of appeals agreed that market forces ensure
diversity in most instances, but they differed on the appropriate steps in
situations not following the norm. Barring an irrational conclusion by
the FCC, case law demanded that the Commission's view prevail. Be-
cause the FCC's position reasonably balanced the need for diversity in
programming against the policy of allowing stations discretion in struc-
turing their formats, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's
determination.15 3
B. The Dissent: In Favor of lexibility.
In dissent, Justice Marshall supported the flexible approach of the
format doctrine and articulated three objections to the majority re-
sult.'5 4 He first argued that both the FCC and the majority misunder-
stood the purpose and effect of the format doctrine.'55 Rather than
being a vehicle for strict regulation by the government, 56 the doctrine
complements the free-market system and compels review of format
changes only when substantialprimafacie evidence, such as public pro-
test, suggests that the market has failed to produce adequate diversity.
The court of appeals' opinion confirms this reading of the format doc-
trine.'57 The majority opinion proceeded on the incorrect premise that
153. 450 U.S. at 595-96.
154. Id. at 604-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting). An additional aspect of the majority's opinion
not discussed in the dissent merits attention. The court of appeals raised but did not address the
issue of the FCC's failure to disclose a staff study on the market control of formats before issuing
the Order. In his concurrence, Judge Bazelon emphasized the FCC's "almost cavalier disregard
for the public's right to comment on the critical data and methodology supporting the Commis-
sion's finding .. " 610 F.2d at 858. He would have struck down the new rule solely for this
procedural error. Id. at 858-59. The court of appeals majority did note the importance of "adver-
sarial testing" of an agency's data and conclusions with regard both to substantive accuracy and
procedural fairness. Because it struck down the order on substantive grounds, however, the court
saw no need to decide whether this procedural flaw alone invalidated the Order. Id. at 846.47,
846 n.24. The Supreme Court dismissed this issue with the conclusory statement, "We... do not
consider the action of the Commission, even if a procedural lapse, to be a sufficient ground for
reopening the proceedings before the Commission." 450 U.S. at 591 n.22.
The Court's treatment of the procedural flaw in WNCN contrasts with its action in Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Benzene). In Benzene OSHA
neglected to call for comments regarding the new benzene standard before the standard's promul-
gation. The Court cited this procedural lapse as a major reason for striking down the standard.
Id. at 623-25. See note 101 supra and accompanying text. Viewed in light of the emphasis placed
on the procedural question in Benzene, the Court's summary dismissal of the identical issue in
WNCN is at best questionable.
155. 450 U.S. at 605-07.
156. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
157. 610 F.2d at 851.
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the format doctrine entails significant government involvement in radio
broadcasting. 58
Justice Marshall's second objection to the WATCN result was the
Court's failure to explain the different treatment of entertainment and
nonentertainment programming changes. During licensing proceed-
ings, the FCC considers listener complaints about nonentertainment
format changes only.1 59 The majority attempted to justify the distinc-
tion by stating that the difference was insignificant. It observed that an
evidentiary hearing concerning changes in nonentertainment formats
can be obtained "'onoi when it appears that the licensee has abused its
broad discretion by acting unreasonably or in bad faith.' 160 However,
if a listener complains that a broadcaster's discontinuation of a particu-
lar entertainment format is unreasonable or in bad faith, the Order pre-
cludes any investigation by the FCC into the matter.' 6'
Justice Marshall's third objection was that "safety valve" proce-
dures, which enable an agency to consider applications for exemptions
from general rules, are necessary for an agency to proceed with fairness
in complex areas.162 Because the Order allowed for no exceptions, the
Justice would have struck it down. 63 Although several of the decisions
cited by Justice Marshall do emphasize the importance of the power to
waive general rules in particular cases, they fall short of establishing a
settled doctrine that all rules must contain a waiver provision.
For instance, in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States164 the
Court explored the validity of regulations that conclusively forbade the
issuance or renewal of licenses to stations with certain network ties. In
a passage Justice Marshall used as support for his safety-valve argu-
ment, the National Broadcasting Court stated:
The Commission ... did not bind itself inflexibly to the licensing
policies expressed in the Regulations. In each case that comes before
it the Commission must still exercise an ultimate judgment whether
the grant of a license would serve the "public interest, convenience,
or necessity." If time and changing circumstances reveal that the
"public interest" is not served by application of the Regulations, it
must be assumed that the Commission will act in accordance with its
158. 450 U.S. at 601-03.
159. See Community Television of S. Cal., 72 F.C.C.2d 349 (1979); Mississippi Auth. for
Educ. TV, 71 F.C.C.2d 1296 (1979); Central Cal. Communications Corp., 70 F.C.C.2d 1947
(1979); Channel 20, Inc., 70 F.C.C.2d 1770 (1979).
160. 450 U.S. at 602 (quoting Mississippi Auth. for Educ. TV, 71 F.C.C.2d 1296, 1308 (1979)).
161. See 450 U.S. at 616-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 609-10.
163. Id. at 607-17.




This passage concerns the FCC's continuing duty to consider the li-
censing policies embodied in the regulations and to revise the regula-
tions if experience shows them to be ineffective or detrimental. The
regulations themselves allowed for no such flexibility. 166 If a station
met the criteria, the rule required the FCC to deny its application for
licensing. Thus, rather than furnishing precedent for Justice Marshall's
argument, National Broadcasting instead supports the result of WNCN
by upholding regulations that allowed for no exceptions.' 67
A second case relied upon by Justice Marshall, however, supports
the safety-valve argument. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co. 168
concerned an FCC regulation prohibiting the grant of a license to a
television station whose owner had a substantial interest in five other
stations. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
struck down the regulation as violative of an applicant's right to a sec-
tion 309(a) 169 hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that sec-
tion 309 does not automatically guarantee a hearing to disappointed
applicants. Nevertheless, the Court noted that the regulations provided
the applicant with an opportunity to obtain a hearing by showing that
the basic premise of the regulation did not apply to his case. The Court
emphasized the importance of this waiver provision in upholding the
regulation.' 70
Although the Court in Storer and National Broadcasting noted the
flexible elements of the FCC regulations, those elements were by no
means the chief rationale for the decisions. 171 The cases fall short of
establishing that waiver provisions are necessary components of rules
165. Id. at 225 (quoted by Justice Marshall in WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 450 U.S. at
610).
166. A Commission statement cited in National Broadcasting indicates the context of the pas-
sage emphasized by Justice Marshall: "The problems in the network field are interdependent, and
the steps now taken may perhaps operate as a partial solution of problems not directly dealt with
at this time. Such problems may be examined again at some future time after the regulations here
adopted have been given a fair trial." FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT ON
CHIN BROADCASTING 88 (1941), quoted in 319 U.S. at 225 (emphasis added).
167. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), also conflicts with the "safety-
valve" argument. In that case the Supreme Court reversed the demand of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit that the FCC consider the economic impact that licensing one
station may have on another. Unlike the situation in WNCN, however, the Act provided fairly
explicit support for the FCC's interpretation. With its emphasis on broadeasiing as a free enter-
prise, the Act discouraged the FCC from insulating stations from fair competition. 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(h) (1976).
168. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
169. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976).
170. 351 U.S. at 205.
171. 450 U.S. at 601 n.44.
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that are based on experience, rather than on hard facts, and that deal
with complex fields. Although Justice Marshall's argument has some
merit, the absence of a waiver provision cannot alone justify the invali-
dation of an agency rule. 172
C. The Law-Policy Distinction: Blind Deference.
The most serious flaw in the W2NCN decision is the Court's failure
to justify its characterization of the FCC regulation as "policy."
Neither the Supreme Court nor the court of appeals explained their
characterizations of the rule. The court of appeals held that the format
doctrine "represents, not a policy, but rather the law of the land
... . ,173 This triggered the court's less deferential standard of review,
which in turn justified striking down the Order. 174 The Supreme Court
identified the regulation as policy, dismissing the court of- appeals'
characterization with the broad statement that "the public-interest stan-
dard of the Act [is] 'a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by
172. The Court rejected a similar flexibility argument challenging agency regulations in
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 101 S.Ct. 2633 (1981). Pursuant to its rulemaking authority under
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(B) (1976), the Secretary of Health and Human
Services established rules determining eligibility for Medicaid benefits. One such rule provided
that the states paying those benefits may "deem" the income of a non-applying spouse to be avail-
able to the spouse applying for benefits, thus decreasing or eliminating the applicant's eligibility.
42 C.F.R. § 435.734 (1980). This "deeming" was allowed even though the spouses maintained
separate quarters, as when one spouse lived in a health care institution. The Gray Panthers organ-
ization sued to strike down the regulation, alleging that it conflicted with the statutory require-
ment that only income actually available to the applicant may be considered in determining
Medicaid eligibility. See 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(17) (1976). The Supreme Court, reversing the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, upheld the regulations. Emphasizing the great
deference due the Secretary's interpretation of the statute, the Court agreed with the Secretary that
the statute conclusively presumes that one spouse's income is available to the other although the
two may live separately. 101 S.Ct. at 2643.
In a dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stevens agreed with the reason-
ing of both the district court and the court of appeals. He repeated the court of appeals' emphasis
on those portions of the legislative history that the presumption that spousal income is available
depends on the spouses' cohabitation. Id. at 2643, 2644 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He stated:
"Congress intended a flexible approach to apply in situations in which the basic assumption of
cohabitation could not be made." Id. at 2644. "IT]he premise that spouses pool income and
resources should not apply when one spouse is institutionalized." Id. at 2644 n.4. Nevertheless,
just as the majority rejected the flexibility argument in WNCN, it interpreted the statute in Gray
Panthers as precluding any such individualized factual determination.
173. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838, 854, rev'd, 450 U.S. 582 (1981) (emphasis
in original).
174. 610 F.2d at 854-55 ("This court has neither the expertise nor the constitutional authority
to make 'policy' as that word is commonly understood. . . . But in matters of interpreting the
'law' the final say is constitutionally committed to the judiciary."); see W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE &
P. STRAuss, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CASES AND COMMENTS 315 (7th ed. 1979); M. HART, JR., &
A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
1345-47 (tenth ed. 1958).
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the expert body which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative
policy.' "175 Because the characterization of a regulation as policy
rather than law leads a reviewing court to accord it greater deference,
the actual nature of the FCC regulation is highly relevant in evaluating
the soundness of the *WACN result.
In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown' 76 the Supreme Court dealt with the
law/policy distinction in deciding whether a regulation constituted
"law" within the meaning of the Trade Secrets Act. 177 Chrysler Corpo-
ration sued to enjoin the Department of Defense from releasing to the
public information that the petitioner had given the Department pursu-
ant to equal employment opportunity requirements. Chrysler, citing a
provision of the Trade Secrets Act prohibiting disclosure of informa-
tion "except as provided by law,"1 78 argued that the regulations 79 pur-
suant to which the Department would release the information were not
law. The Supreme Court agreed, distinguishing "substantive rules"
from general statements of policy by stating that a substantive rule is
one "'affecting individual rights and obligations.' "180 If the agency
has the power to promulgate the substantive rule and follows the re-
quired procedures, then the rule carries "the 'force and effect of
law.' " 181
The courts of appeals have elaborated on the attributes of regula-
tions that constitute policy rather than law. Policy merely describes
the basic standards that the agency will apply in deciding future sub-
stantive questions. Policy is not "finally determinative of the issues or
rights to which it is addressed"; it "must leave the agency free to exer-
cise its discretion and must not establish a 'binding norm.' "1182 If a
175. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 450 U.S. 582, 593 (1981) (quoting FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940)).
176. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
178. Id
179. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60.40-1 to .40-4 (1978) (current version at 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-40.1-.4 (1981)).
180. 441 U.S. at 302.
[I]n Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), we noted a characteristic inherent in the con-
cept of a "substantive rule." We described a substantive rule-or a "legislative-type
rule,"--as one "affecting individual rights and obligations." This characteristic is an
important touchstone for distinguishing those rules that may be "binding" or have the
"force of law."
441 U.S. at 302 (citations omitted).
181. 441 U.S. 281, 302 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974)). See Batterton v.
Francis, 432 U.S. 416,425 n.9 (1977); Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 217,
223 (1963); United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 437-38 (1960); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v.
Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937).
182. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1981); Regular Com-
mon Carrier Conference of the Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 628 F.2d 248, 251-52 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); American Bus Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See Farm-
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regulation establishes a strict rule that finally determines an issue and
leaves the agency no discretion, then that regulation is law.
The FCC's entertainment programming regulation, in light of the
above criteria, is law rather than policy. The regulation is determina-
tive on the issue of entertainment programming changes; it precludes
the FCC from considering whether a change in entertainment pro-
gramming should prohibit the assignment or renewal of a station's li-
cense. Rather than speaking in terms of presumptions, 183 or providing
opportunities for decisions on an individual basis, 184 the regulation in
WNCN conclusively determines that no change in entertainment for-
mat affects the "public interest, convenience, or necessity" so adversely
that it prevents the grant or renewal of a station's license. In short, the
regulation precludes the Commission from exercising its informed dis-
cretion in the various entertainment-format cases that come before it.
Because the regulation significantly affects "individual rights," it is
a "substantive rule" within the meaning of the law/policy test estab-
lished in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown. 85 The FCC affords listeners no rem-
edy when a station abandons a particular entertainment format to their
detriment. Entertainment programming conveys the "social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences" to which the first
amendment guarantees access.'8 6 The FCC regulation stifles listener
remedies when a station's change of format impinges upon that first
amendment right. The regulation very definitely affects "individual
rights"-sensitive first amendment rights-an attribute that invests the
regulation with "the force and effect of law."
Whether the regulation would have survived less deferential scru-
tiny, the Court's flawed conception of deference endangers first amend-
land Indus., Inc. v. United States, 642 F.2d 208, 210, (7th Cir. 1981); Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. FSLIC, 589 F.2d 658, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d
33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
183. See Regular Common Carrier Conference of the Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. United States,
628 F.2d 248, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
184. See Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 589 F.2d 658, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The
Guardian court also stated that if a rule lays down "stringent substantive commands," it consti-
tutes law even if it has "some provision for discretionary waiver." Id. "A waiver provision is no
substitute for the exercise of informed discretion in the various cases arising under the regulation."
Id. at 667 n.33. See WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Texaco, Inc. v.
FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969).
185. 441 U.S. 281 (1979). See notes 180-81 supra and accompanying text.
186. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
[Tihe people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective
right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First
Amendment. It is the right of... listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount.... It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.
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ment rights. Given the regulation's inflexible nature and restriction of
first amendment rights, the Court was obligated to review the regula-
tion more rigorously than a non-binding statement of policy. Instead,
in keeping with the tenaciously deferential stance adopted in other re-
cent cases, 187 the Supreme Court assumed that it owed extreme defer-
ence to the Commission and neglected to examine the validity of that
assumption.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decisions of 1980 and 1981 clearly manifest a
tendency to defer in practice as well as in theory to agency rulemaking
and adjudication. This tendency is in marked contrast to the more rig-
orous review of the past decade and in some instances produces ques-
tionable results. In Strycker's Bay, for example, the Court used the
deference principle to justify its superficial review of the agency's deci-
sion, and in WNCN the Court's mistaken basis for affording extreme
deference to the Commission produced cursory review of a regulation
restricting first amendment rights. That the judiciary should generally
defer to agency determinations is a sound and established principle.' 88
Nonetheless, the Court's indiscriminate and even careless adherence to
this principle not only detracts from the soundness of the particular
cases but also upsets the balance between the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of government. Only through reasoned application
of deference can the judiciary achieve both meaningful review of
agency decisions and the respect due those decisions.
Benjamin Eagles Fountain, III
187. See notes 19-77 supra and accompanying text.
188. See Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of AgencyAction, 31
AD. L. REv. 329 (1979).
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